

Production Essay to accompany the film:

Time/Money = Change

NGOs and Cultural Change in Juba, South Sudan

Introduction

This paper will investigate the relationship between two distinct periods of externally stimulated change in South Sudan. This investigation will begin with a brief contextualising summary of the history of Sudan as a nation. It will then seek to compare the forms of political, economic and cultural exchange active during periods of colonial administration to those active in contemporary international development efforts. Finally, it will advance this comparison with a summary of my specific findings during fieldwork; thereby evaluating contemporary local responses to recent development efforts in the context of historical responses to similar types of change.

Over the course of these comparisons, particular attention will be played to the role of local agency in legitimising and actualising externally conceived plans and ultimately realising forms of change that are neither entirely Sudanese nor entirely Western. It should be made clear that the ambitions of this paper are not to reach any normative, moral judgement of the effects of either past or present external agencies on the peoples of South Sudan. It seeks rather to identify and analyse the ways in which local actors are able to rationalise and adapt to rapidly shifting forms of external coercion, and ultimately appropriate global structures of power into locally relevant forms. Information of this nature is clearly vitally important to any critique of development strategies and practices seeking more productive conclusions than re-phrasings of the knee-jerk cliché that ‘all externally coerced change must be inherently damaging’.

The Story so Far:
Sudanese Colonial History and Beyond

Sudan has a long and tortuous history of overlapping colonial regimes, dating back to the early 19th Century. In 1820 Turco-Egyptian forces led by the Muhammad Ali dynasty conquered the land we now know as Sudan. This regime sought access to the country's rich Ivory resources, coming to an end at the hands of an internal Jihad in 1885 - three years after the British occupation of Egypt (Sharkey 2003:4). During the revolt the British Governor General in Sudan's capital Khartoum (General Gordon) was killed as the city was sacked and placed under Sharia law. A violent 'Anglo-Egyptian' re-conquest took place in 1898, resulting in the fixing of Sudan's borders to help guard against other European colonial presences in East Africa. Thus, Sudan was defined as Africa's largest country, with an area of almost one million square miles.

Between 1898 and 1956, Sudan was effectively a British colony, although at the time the administration insisted that it was shared with Egypt as a "Condominium" (Sharkey 2003:6). It differed from the majority of otherwise similar British colonies, in that the expatriate presence was largely limited to higher-level administrative personnel and there was no significant settling of the land. Between the years of 1930 and 1940, E. E. Evans-Pritchard was commissioned by the Anglo-Egyptian Government to investigate the cultural beliefs and social structure of the Nuer people of Central Sudan. This period of study produced one of the seminal works of early 20th Century anthropology, and is emblematic of anthropology during the period in its essential functional status as an extension of the colonial ruling apparatus.

By 1924, growing unrest among the peoples of Sudan was manifested in the first (unsuccessful) attempt at gaining independence. From that time until the declaration of independence and withdrawal of British and Egyptian forces in 1956, Sudan was run as two essentially separate colonies, the North and the South. This division was justified as necessary to defend the Southern tribal groups from raiding and exploitation at the hands of Northern Arab traders, but had the effect of reifying cultural differences between the two regions and reinforcing the emerging religious and linguistic polarity of the country. Northerners were educated in Arabic at government schools, and Islam became the majority religion. Education in the South was left in the hands of Christian missionaries, who were severely under-equipped to cope with such a dispersed and diverse array of tribal groups. Consequently, the South maintained a mixture of Christian and indigenous animist religious forms, and similarly spoke a mixture of English, Arabic and tribal dialects.

It was in this fractured, confused state that the nation of Sudan was left at independence in 1956, and its people were apparently aware of the instability of such fragmentation. In fact, the first civil war¹ began in anticipation of independence, as the Southerners realised that the superior technological, infrastructural and military capacities of the North left them vulnerable to a return to the domination and subjection of times past. The first Sudanese civil war raged for seventeen years, until the signing of the Addis Ababa agreement in 1972. As in many post-colonial civil conflicts, the opposing sides were themselves highly

¹ Called Anyanya One in Sudan.

factionalised, and fighting was chaotic and unpredictable: an estimated 500,000 people were killed. Only 100,000 were designated combatants.

The peace promised by the Addis Ababa agreement was short lived, and by 1983 Dr. John Garang had formed the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and war broke out in response to perceived disregard for the terms of the Addis Ababa agreement by the North. The second Sudanese civil war² lasted 22 years, and massive destruction was wrought indiscriminately on the peoples of the South. Nearly two million people died during the conflict, and a further four million were forced to flee their homes - living as Internally Displace People (IDPs) or international refugees. The U.S. supplied arms throughout the 1970s (in an attempt to counter soviet influence in Libya and Ethiopia), and although this support was stopped by 1987, the country was by then relatively heavily armed. By 2001, the U.S. government and the UN initiated Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), importing food and survival supplies to all of Sudan. By 2003 peace negotiations had begun and in 2005 the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed by North and South in Nairobi, Kenya.

Under the terms of the CPA, the new nation of South Sudan will remain autonomous until 2011, when an internally elected government will carry out a national referendum to determine whether to re-join with the North and form a single nation under a combined North-South government, or become its own nation with a government based in its capital city of Juba.

² Called Anyanya Two in Sudan.

Historic Change:
Anglo-Egyptian Rule and its Effects

In *Living with Colonialism*, Heather Sharkey provides an in depth analysis colonial rule in Sudan, with a strong emphasis on local perspectives. Her work focuses on the geo-political hub of Khartoum, tracing the formation of a class of local elites through institutions such as Gordon College (founded by the British in 1902). For Sharkey, educational institutions such as this one played a crucial twofold role in many African colonies “as both a training ground for bureaucracy and a crucible for nationalism” (2003:7). Although nationalist sentiments were a major contributing factor to the eventual decline in British influence in the region, their development was paradoxically facilitated (and ostensibly catalysed) by the cultural and infrastructural changes implemented by the colonial system.

If the British colonial presence managed to create a lasting and problematic conception of the ‘nation of Sudan’, it did so initially through the implementation of state structures. This process was founded on principles firmly embedded in intrinsically western models of the nation-state, as Sharkey highlights:

If nations are souls, then states are bodies, giving form and function to corporate organizations. States are, in short, the structures of government. Yet, although a nation is not the same as a state, the two are connected and often conflated as a “nation-state.” This term implies a national community and the administrative “roof” above it is, or should be, congruent and mutually reinforcing (2003:124).

This essential element of the colonial project cannot be sufficiently described as a purely top-down process. It must be acknowledged that the expatriate presence played a largely coordinating, or catalytic role in state building. In order to implement actual change on a ground level, colonial regimes were obliged to employ (and therefore, first, to create) a class of intermediary functionaries. “Britons may have had weapons, confidence, and competence, but more practically, they had local support staffs, deputed to carry out many of empire’s mundane tasks” (Sharkey 2003:2). The integration of educated Sudanese into the colonial apparatus (mostly as clerks and low-level administrators) bridged otherwise insurmountable cultural and linguistic divides between the rulers and the ruled.

Cultural change and the foundations of Sudanese nationalism were also implemented technologically: “[r]oads, railways, automobiles, and steam boats; telegraphs, telephones and postal systems: along these and other channels, conceptions of cultural space and social identity evolved” (Sharkey 2003:9). It is significant to notice that these changes, although geographically pervasive, were socially stratifying – separating the literate from the illiterate; the rich from the poor; and those involved in the administration from those who were not.

These processes of internal fracturing can be seen as small-scale manifestations of the greater colonial policy of ‘divide and rule’. In Sudan this policy took on special significance in the case of the 1924 North/South divide. This divide was strategically important to the administration as it prevented the spread of Islam and overtly nationalist sentiments from North to South. It was also well suited to the administration’s choice to almost entirely exclude even well educated Southerners from administrative roles.

The process of local education and employment (and thus empowerment) was referred to as the generalised 'sudanization' of the imperial regime, although almost all of the members of this new class of local elites were Northern, Arab Sudanese. Between 1924 and 1956, as colonialism began to falter worldwide under the economic and military strain of the World Wars, sudanization became a growing trend. Sudanese independence loomed on the horizon as an inevitable eventuality and the British presence began to dwindle. As British administrators began to leave their posts, the newly formed class of administrative worker filtered up through the ranks:

[At] decolonization, the British transferred power to a monocultural elite: Arabic speaking Muslim males from the riverain North, who had been the primary beneficiaries of colonial educational and hiring policies. Drawing upon ideas that they had discussed in literature at a time when they still lacked power, these nationalists prepared to press a vision inspired by Arabic and Islam (Sharkey 2003:123).

It is perhaps unsurprising that civil war broke out prior even to the realisation of independence, intensified so quickly and lasted for so long. Given the culturally heterogenising legacy of 'divide and rule' policies, the loss of the illusory stability of a commandeering colonial presence seems retrospectively bound to have sparked open conflict. Whilst Southerners had significantly integrated English and Christianity into their tribal languages and animist religions, they had received little or no truly empowering education or stabilising infrastructural development. The South had thus effectively remained a collection of largely independent cultural groups. As Sharkey summarises: "more than any other group within the colonial territory, educated Northerners developed a sense of the Sudan as a unitary whole, with Khartoum as its metropole, and the provinces and districts as its hinterlands" (2003:10).

Contextualising ‘Development’: *Universalising Narratives of Global Development Policy*

The modern development industry was founded on principles of aid giving established in response to the extensive destruction caused during the World Wars. The end of WWII heralded an inversion of expansionist and colonialist policies for European powers, as former imperial powers re-focused their efforts on internal reconstruction and economic development. At this time, a philosophy of ‘development’ was formulated around a simplified imagining of the dynamics of economic growth. In 1944, The Bretton Woods agreement created the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, conceived to allow recovering countries access to development funds against prospective economic growth (Nolan 2002:34). Given the relatively straightforward goals of the development project as it was originally imagined, it is unsurprising that it assumed an equally simple set of operating principles and measures of success.

The axioms of ‘development’, as defined in the Bretton Woods agreement, were as follows. Development on a national level is best achieved by targeting the overall economy, encouraging rapid growth of Gross National Product (GNP) and hence increasing exports. It was assumed that overall economic growth would eventually result in a more-or-less uniform improvement of the standard of living in those nations, according to classical economic principles of trickle-down wealth. Riall Nolan summarises the assumptions at the core of development strategy:

What might be termed as a *technicist* approach therefore guided development thinking from the outset. The *ends* sought were primarily material, *strategy* was derived from Western economic theory, and the *means* consisted of Western capital combined with Western technology and know how. Progress, of course, would be measured in economic terms, and industrialized societies would be the model to which weaker economies should aspire (2002:45 - emphasis original).

As the Cold War began to grow throughout the 50s and 60s, Western countries began to realise the political importance of much of the third world. The U.S. in particular began to invest heavily in ‘developing’ those countries that held particular geo-political significance in the competition to maintain power against the Soviet bloc. Recipients of such aid were keen to take advantage of this battle of the superpowers, as Nolan notes:

These nations, short on cash and trained manpower, readily accepted foreign assistance from both sides, and quickly learned to bargain for aid within the framework of superpower rivalry. Within a few years, *security assistance* had become an important subcategory of development aid ... Development aid in the United States quickly became linked with America’s broader diplomatic, military, and strategic interests (2002:46 – emphasis original).

For the purposes of this paper, the development industry can be considered as constituted of three primary elements: multilateral agencies, bilateral agencies and Nongovernmental Organisations (NGOs). Multilateral agencies are aid-giving bodies representing groups of nations, three examples are the United Nations (UN), the World Bank and the IMF. Bilateral agencies function to allocate and distribute funds from one government to specific programs judged to conform to predetermined specifications, which in turn depend on the priorities and interests of the country represented. The United States Agency for International

Development (USAID) is a particularly prominent example. It is accountable to the U.S. Congress, the State Department and the National Security Council. As such it must show that its endowment is used to further U.S. political and military interests (or at the very least avoid hindering them). The geographic foci of USAID support have shifted with the global political climate, but as Nolan points out, “[o]ne aspect of of [US]AID operation that is constant ... is the need to move development money through the pipeline as quickly as possible” (2002:38). In order to maintain the belief that the organisation is both efficient and necessary, money granted must always be spent (and the faster, the better). The 2007 fiscal year budget request for all USAID projects was \$9.3billion, and \$600million was allocated to aid in Sudan alone.

In order to distribute such large sums quickly and effectively, aid agencies construct overarching development *policies* from which they design potential *programs*. The role of the NGOs then, is to realise their national *programs* by implementing local *projects*. At each tier of the hierarchy, plans are checked to ensure the money is being used towards achieving goals in line with those set out in the original *policies*. In one important sense though, the efficacy of these checks is severely limited, as they are carried out on a purely anticipatory basis. Once a program or project is approved, there is no true accountability on the part of either the agency (to their sources of funding), or the implementing body (to their funding agency).

From this brief summary of the mechanics behind the development industry, two problematic facts become clear. Firstly, as Nolan states,

there is simply no direct connection between development agencies and the results they obtain from their projects in the field. There are no institutional consequences for failure, no rewards for success ... [T]he main criterion for success appears to be, in virtually all the agencies, the ability to move money through the system with the minimum of friction (2002:239).

Secondly, what is perhaps of more concern in an anthropological examination of development industry is the degree of consideration given to cultural change by the development discourse. Namely: none. Since planning and implementation are carried out in a top-down manner, there is little, if any consideration of factors outside of the original project specifications. As projects are based upon quantitative economic and social definitions of development, cultural change falls into a blind spot of the apparatus itself.

Here emerges the similarity between some of the central structural assumptions of colonial and development policies in the case of Sudan. A century ago, the British colonial administration focused their efforts on state building (through infrastructural and technological changes) in order to simplify resource extraction and secure political stability. The contemporary development apparatus focuses upon economic and political capacity building as the one-size-fits-all cure to underdevelopment. The models of change held by both the colonial and development presences were equally derived from simplified imaginings of the relationship between global (politico-economic) structures and local (culturally informed) behaviours and practices.

In the colonial case, the pragmatic cultural effects of the British presence initiated a strong current of nationalism that became a central contribution to the project’s eventual catastrophic failure and the reversal of many of the structural changes they had managed to

implement. This paper will now draw on the results of my fieldwork experience in order to analyse more closely the specific case of development in South Sudan. This analysis will provide a more detailed picture of the possible role that unchecked cultural change could have in defining the eventual outcomes of such development projects.

In the Field:
Localising the Global

My fieldwork focus was guided significantly by the ideas presented in Norman Long's *Development Sociology – Actor Perspectives*. This volume documents the findings of an ethnographic study of development in rural Mexico, carried out and interpreted according to what he calls the interface perspective (2001:69). An analysis performed from the interface perspective “focuses on the linkages and networks that develop between individuals or parties rather than on individual or group strategies” (2001:69). This approach allows the ethnographer the freedom to escape from the trappings associated with a singular, monocultural envisioning of the dynamics of an inherently multicultural system. In Long's case, the resulting study emphasises the role of local people occupying administrative roles in externally conceived projects.

In the case of South Sudan, where almost all the NGOs and multilateral groups are of external (i.e. Western) origin, there are two obvious candidates for the subject of an interface analysis. Many elements of the development presence in South Sudan operate on (or in conjunction with) the newly formed Government of South Sudan (GoSS). This fact suggests the first possible subjects of an interface analysis of the development industry: the members and employees of GoSS itself. For the majority of the time, these individuals play roles of cultural translation, between the Western conceptual schemes of expatriate NGO employees and plans and the perspective of their constituencies and workmates.

However, given the duration of my research, this group proved too difficult to access – mainly due to high workloads and scarcity of individuals well qualified for government work. Instead, I choose to focus my research upon the other significant group of interface perspective actors: the local employees of expatriate run NGOs. This group is particularly significant in the context of an analysis of cultural change, because they not only possess a unique local perspective on the pervasive effects of the development industry, but are also themselves part of its mechanisms.

Juba is the capital city of South Sudan, a war-torn former garrison town with an estimated population of 800,000. It is the seat of the nation's government and most new ministry buildings (government departments) are being constructed within the cities boundaries. Juba is the hub of NGO activities in the whole of South Sudan, with most organisations active in the country represented in some capacity and a large fortified UN barracks on the outskirts of town. It was in and around Juba that I spent the month of May 2007.

One of the first things that struck me during the early days of my fieldwork was the relative rarity of local employees, and the typically menial, administrative roles that they occupied. Expatriate NGO representatives I questioned on this situation cited the lack of qualified or experienced South Sudanese available, many also mentioning the local's unfamiliarity with Western norms of professional conduct as a potential problem. The majority of the Sudanese jobs created as a result of the NGO presence are associated with the service industry that has sprung up to house, feed and transport expatriates.

Almost all expatriate employees in Juba live in secured compounds, mostly on prime property along the banks of the Nile. These compounds are owned and managed by either

Western, Kenyan or Ugandan companies, but employ Sudanese as security guards and 'casual workers' (kitchen, cleaning, building and maintenance staff). In this sense the local cultural effects of the NGO presence are not only implemented through political capacity building and community outreach work, but also indirectly through the intermediary administrative workers, drivers and camp staff with whom they have regular and relatively informal contact with.

The conclusions of my research were based chiefly upon the perspectives of four main Sudanese informants, but are equally shaped by many informal meetings and chance observations. These four main informants are also the central characters in my film. There will now follow a brief description of each of their perspectives before a more unifying evaluation.

Taban Aldo Alex is a recently returned refugee in his early thirties who came to Juba to search for work with an NGO or as a teacher. He was a confident and engaging individual with an infectious, almost incongruently optimistic outlook. During our interviews he repeatedly returned to the subject of the African resources, informing me: "we need to make much better use of our resources". He often talked in terms of "here" (South Sudan) and "there" (presumably the developed world in general), contrasting Western and African approaches to time. He told me with almost revelatory excitement of an American he had met who informed him: "Time is the most wasted resource in Africa". This point seemed to have made quite an impression on Taban, who considered development in relatively simplistic terms. He imagined the Western world as "a little paradise ... very good to live in, or very good to visit", and believed that through the vague and mysterious process of 'development' "Sudan could become a place just like America, or England and the rest".

Kwori Benered is a returned refugee who grew up in a camp near the Ugandan border. I met him at the 'African Expeditions' camp (AFEX) where I was staying as guest and he is employed as a casual worker, painting and clearing leaves. His intention was to save enough money to be able to return to school, which he saw as the only possible route to security and happiness in the long term. He lamented the recent emergence of patterns of extreme consumerism in Juba, particularly among the youth population: "Our young children here in Juba are not going to school – they just want to get money". He claimed that many locals viewed expatriates as "very important people", whilst also seeing them as a potential sources of money. He was unwilling to enter into detailed consideration of the role of the NGOs, stating that they were merely here "to develop Juba, and to change the behaviour of its people." When asked to comment on his impression of change in Juba, he replied simply: "change must come slow but sure – because we have been from the bush."

Mary Faida has been an office assistant with the UN for the past eighteen months. Her family are from the Bari tribe, and she was very proud of her people's reputation as a "welcoming and sharing." She spent her young life moving around Southern Sudan with her family, avoiding the threats constituted by the civil war. Mary was able to offer analyses of the different kinds of change brought about by the foreign presence, drawing a sharp distinction between those changes she was happy and those that she perceived as more problematic. She noted shifts in traditional attitudes toward the appropriate behaviour of women, predicting a continuing emancipation of women from patriarchal tribal systems. She was unhappy that the NGOs had mostly brought "tents and containers" to live and work in,

instead of building solid buildings. Mary described this approach to housing emblematic of the transitive or openly temporary nature of much of the externally inspired changes currently underway: “they come - after some time - they go ... I don’t know – how do we benefit from them? Us. The locals.”

Galdino Ochama returned to Sudan from Kenya as a program officer with a U.S. NGO in 2005, he has since then built a small modern house on the outskirts of town where he lives with his wife, son, mother and mother in law. Coming from a relatively affluent family, he received his undergraduate degree from University of Khartoum, and won a scholarship to go to the University of Reading, receiving an MSc in applied development studies in 2001. He previously worked for the NGO full time and received what he described as a “very good salary, by Sudanese standards”, but has recently chosen to divide his time between NGO and local government work. Galdino now works two days a week for the NGO (from which he receives the majority of his salary), and the other three days at the South Sudan Reconstruction Commission (SSRC). He contrasted the two working environments: “with the NGOs everything is programmed in a way – you know that you have to do this by this date ... I am always learning ... whereas with the Government, all eyes are on me”. Galdino describes his choice to settle for a significantly lower salary as an attempt to share his rare combination of local cultural understanding and global awareness and training. He sees this move as a clear symbol of his deeply patriotic ideology, but it also highlights an understanding he has gained from six years as a local employee in the development industry. Although he avoided phrasing it in terms of a sacrifice, Galdino’s choice to work for the Sudanese government (despite the accompanying economic loss) reflects an awareness of the side of development that must be carried out through (and not merely operate upon) local political bodies and structures.

Having experienced life in England for over a year, his comments revealed a strong awareness of the ways in which South Sudanese culture was being affected by the expatriate presence. He talked of the decline of traditional forms of marriage – and the role of a cattle bridewealth (dowry) played in “binding together” the community. He also pointed to tribal solidarity as “one of the causes of conflict in South Sudan ... simply because people are so close to one another; so cohesive, that anyone one from outside is considered an enemy.” In considering the likely implications of contemporary change, Galdino predicted an increase in the shift from what he called “communal communities”, towards “nuclear families”. He pointed out that in the West “people are all *individuals*, that is all”, suggesting that once South Sudan has been ‘developed’ (and people think of themselves as individuals), there will be no more reason for conflict.

Overall, Galdino’s perspectives on change were very balanced, never shying away from the concealed losses yet always managing to maintain a healthy optimism regarding the bigger picture. He reassured me: “I do not think culture is static, no, culture is dynamic – that means it is always changing ... we take the good things and leave the bad – that’s how things are here in South Sudan”. Even as he was describing his belief in the importance of maintaining Sudanese traditional cultural values, he acknowledged his own role in the development process and thus represents a definitive ‘inside/outsider’.

These four individuals can be seen as representing three significant groups in the expatriate/local interface. They can be productively arranged as positions within a hierarchy

of economic, cultural and ideological integration into the development apparatus. In this hierarchy Taban represents the 'pure local' (aware of the development presence, but only able to fix its significance via imaginative leaps); Kworri represents the 'involved local' (partially aware of the structure of the development presence, and regularly exposed to a wide range of Western cultural behaviours); Mary and Galdino represent the minority of Sudanese that occupy 'inside/outsider' roles in the development industry (aware of the internal mechanics of NGO operations, and involved in constant close interactions with Western cultural behaviours).

A correlation can be posited between the degree of a local's 'involvement' in an external system, and their accompanying 'awareness' of the mechanics and possible effects of the system. This conclusion seems intuitive enough, but is brought into particular relevance by a consideration of the development apparatus as what James Ferguson has called "The Anti-Politics Machine". In his volume by the same name, Ferguson claims that the overall effect of the development industry is to

depoliticiz[e] everything it touches, everywhere whisking political realities out of sight, all the while performing, almost unnoticed, its own pre-eminently political operation of expanding bureaucratic state power (1994:xv).

In South Sudan, as in many other countries experiencing international development efforts, the only ones that are equipped to even begin to examine (and hence question) the pragmatic effects of the development industry, are the ones already involved and invested in (and on some level dependant upon) its workings. This paradox is the key to the otherwise inexplicable efficacy of the 'anti-politics machine'.

Connecting Contexts of Change:
How can Colonialism and Development be Productively Related?

In both colonial and contemporary cases, the only direct interface between external and internal actors was, and is limited to an elite of highly educated and aware individuals. In the colonial case, the educated elite were inspired into extreme nationalism and used their understanding of the mechanics of state-building to begin a government which went on to wage fifty years of war on the peoples of half their new nation-state. This observation is not intended to pass judgement on these individuals, but rather to point out the kinds of tensions inherent to the creation of such an extreme imbalance in the cultural norms, values and agency of a previously more egalitarian population.

In the case of the new nation of South Sudan, things may appear more straightforward, but the population of the nation are still significantly divided along tribal lines. There is every possibility that the country will see open conflict again before the CPA is completed. Even if South Sudan manages to become a bona fide independent nation in 2011, this would only increase the existing North-South tensions. All NGOs have evacuation procedures planned, and the majority of the expatriate population would leave Juba within 48 hours in an emergency. Taking this possibility as the equivalent of the rushed British hand over at independence, the political future of South Sudan would again be left in the hands of a few highly educated people possessing an image of the future of the nation inspired primarily by external influences and discourses. Needless to say, this situation is unlikely to permit the continuation of development narratives after the departure of their instigating presence(s).

It seems clear that if the development industry found ways to invest more resources in the establishment of a strong base of local employees, many of the local cultural effects of the external presence could be anticipated, noticed, and integrated into the fabric of projects at the ground level. This move would shift the emphasis of 'development' away from the abstraction of global policy planning, and towards the practicalities of the local. It would allow the blanket global policies necessitated by the sheer scale of the development industry to be adapted to fit their deployed contexts.

Creating change is one thing that NGOs have no difficulty achieving in extreme situations such as that currently facing South Sudan. The major difficulty to be overcome is ensuring that these changes are implemented through such means as to become a permanent and fitting part of the local cultural m el ee. If they are not, then the changes wrought stand as much chance of threatening lasting peace as supporting it.

On my last morning in Juba, hours before my flight departed to Nairobi, I visited the Ministry of Culture and Information to return my 'press pass', and collect the ID I had left in its place. After a brief consultation with some administrative staff in the building's central courtyard, I realised that the person possessing the keys necessary to retrieve my ID was unlikely to arrive for some time. I continued to converse with one animated individual, and the subject turned to the differences between what he called 'Western' and 'African' ways of keeping time. Given the situation, he naturally assumed a position light-heartedly defending his absent colleague, soon providing me with an intriguing and poetic explanation of our predicament:

“You kawajas (*whites*) have done much in South Sudan, but there is one thing that you have not realised... You may change our minds, but you will never change our hearts.”

If the international development industry were to begin incorporating local populations more holistically into its operational structures, then perhaps a new, more sustainable form of cultural change would be allowed to emerge. Only then could it realistically aspire to engaging both local hearts *and* minds, and initiating lasting forms of ‘development’.

Word Count: 5264

Bibliography

Ferguson, James

1994 *The Anti-Politics Machine, "Development," Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic Power In Lesotho*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Long, Norman

2001 *Development Sociology, Actor perspectives*. Oxon, New York: Routledge.

Nolan, Riall

2002 *Development Anthropology, Encounters in the Real World*. Oxford, Boulder: Westview Press.

Sharkey, Heather

2003 *Living with Colonialism, Nationalism and Culture in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan* London: University of California Press.